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@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
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\usepackage{graphicx}
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\usepackage{graphicx}
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\usepackage{layout}
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\usepackage{layout}
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\usepackage{fancyhdr}
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\usepackage{fancyhdr}
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+\usepackage{float}
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\def\union{\cup}
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\def\union{\cup}
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\def\intersect{\cap}
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\def\intersect{\cap}
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\def\getsrandom{\stackrel{\rm R}{\gets}}
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\def\getsrandom{\stackrel{\rm R}{\gets}}
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@@ -2523,7 +2524,7 @@ int unregister_hash(const struct _hash_descriptor *hash);
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The following hashes are provided as of this release within the LibTomCrypt library:
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The following hashes are provided as of this release within the LibTomCrypt library:
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\index{Hash descriptor table}
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\index{Hash descriptor table}
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-\begin{figure}[h]
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+\begin{figure}[H]
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\begin{center}
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\begin{center}
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\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
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\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
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\hline \textbf{Name} & \textbf{Descriptor Name} & \textbf{Size of Message Digest (bytes)} \\
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\hline \textbf{Name} & \textbf{Descriptor Name} & \textbf{Size of Message Digest (bytes)} \\
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@@ -3627,7 +3628,7 @@ descriptor twice, and will return the index of the current placement in the tabl
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will return \textbf{CRYPT\_OK} if the PRNG was found and removed. Otherwise, it returns \textbf{CRYPT\_ERROR}.
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will return \textbf{CRYPT\_OK} if the PRNG was found and removed. Otherwise, it returns \textbf{CRYPT\_ERROR}.
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\subsection{PRNGs Provided}
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\subsection{PRNGs Provided}
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-\begin{figure}[h]
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+\begin{figure}[H]
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\begin{center}
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\begin{center}
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\begin{small}
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\begin{small}
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\begin{tabular}{|c|c|l|}
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\begin{tabular}{|c|c|l|}
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@@ -5166,7 +5167,7 @@ The variable \textit{prng} is an active PRNG state and \textit{wprng} the index
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\textit{group\_size} the more difficult a forgery becomes upto a limit. The value of $group\_size$ is limited by
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\textit{group\_size} the more difficult a forgery becomes upto a limit. The value of $group\_size$ is limited by
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$15 < group\_size < 1024$ and $modulus\_size - group\_size < 512$. Suggested values for the pairs are as follows.
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$15 < group\_size < 1024$ and $modulus\_size - group\_size < 512$. Suggested values for the pairs are as follows.
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-\begin{figure}[h]
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+\begin{figure}[H]
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\begin{center}
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\begin{center}
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\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
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\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
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\hline \textbf{Bits of Security} & \textbf{group\_size} & \textbf{modulus\_size} \\
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\hline \textbf{Bits of Security} & \textbf{group\_size} & \textbf{modulus\_size} \\
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@@ -6666,7 +6667,7 @@ e^{1.923 \cdot ln(n)^{1 \over 3} \cdot ln(ln(n))^{2 \over 3}}
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Note that $n$ is not the bit-length but the magnitude. For example, for a 1024-bit key $n = 2^{1024}$. The work required
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Note that $n$ is not the bit-length but the magnitude. For example, for a 1024-bit key $n = 2^{1024}$. The work required
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is:
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is:
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-\begin{figure}[h]
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+\begin{figure}[H]
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\begin{center}
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\begin{center}
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\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
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\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
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\hline RSA/DH Key Size (bits) & Work Factor ($log_2$) \\
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\hline RSA/DH Key Size (bits) & Work Factor ($log_2$) \\
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@@ -6686,7 +6687,7 @@ is:
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The work factor for ECC keys is much higher since the best attack is still fully exponential. Given a key of magnitude
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The work factor for ECC keys is much higher since the best attack is still fully exponential. Given a key of magnitude
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$n$ it requires $\sqrt n$ work. The following table summarizes the work required:
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$n$ it requires $\sqrt n$ work. The following table summarizes the work required:
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-\begin{figure}[h]
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+\begin{figure}[H]
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\begin{center}
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\begin{center}
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\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
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\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
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\hline ECC Key Size (bits) & Work Factor ($log_2$) \\
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\hline ECC Key Size (bits) & Work Factor ($log_2$) \\
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Steffen Jaeckel