trim trailing spaces

src/pk/asn1/der/sequence/der_decode_sequence_ex.c

@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ int der_decode_sequence_ex(const unsigned char *in, unsigned long  inlen,
 
    LTC_ARGCHK(in   != NULL);
    LTC_ARGCHK(list != NULL);
-   
+
    /* get blk size */
    if (inlen < 2) {
       return CRYPT_INVALID_PACKET;
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ int der_decode_sequence_ex(const unsigned char *in, unsigned long  inlen,
    /* mark all as unused */
    for (i = 0; i < (int)outlen; i++) {
        list[i].used = 0;
-   }     
+   }
 
   /* ok read data */
    inlen = blksize;
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ int der_decode_sequence_ex(const unsigned char *in, unsigned long  inlen,
        data = list[i].data;
        if (!ordered && list[i].used == 1) { continue; }
 
-       if (type == LTC_ASN1_EOL) { 
+       if (type == LTC_ASN1_EOL) {
           break;
        }
 
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ int der_decode_sequence_ex(const unsigned char *in, unsigned long  inlen,
                    goto LBL_ERR;
                 }
                 break;
-          
+
            case LTC_ASN1_INTEGER:
                z = inlen;
                if ((err = der_decode_integer(in + x, z, data)) != CRYPT_OK) {
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ int der_decode_sequence_ex(const unsigned char *in, unsigned long  inlen,
                if ((err = der_length_short_integer(((unsigned long*)data)[0], &z)) != CRYPT_OK) {
                   goto LBL_ERR;
                }
-               
+
                break;
 
            case LTC_ASN1_BIT_STRING:
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ int der_decode_sequence_ex(const unsigned char *in, unsigned long  inlen,
                }
                z = 2;
                break;
-                  
+
            case LTC_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER:
                z = inlen;
                if ((err = der_decode_object_identifier(in + x, z, data, &size)) != CRYPT_OK) {
@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ int der_decode_sequence_ex(const unsigned char *in, unsigned long  inlen,
                   goto LBL_ERR;
                }
                break;
-           
+
            case LTC_ASN1_SETOF:
            case LTC_ASN1_SEQUENCE:
                /* detect if we have the right type */
@@ -274,24 +274,24 @@ int der_decode_sequence_ex(const unsigned char *in, unsigned long  inlen,
        x           += z;
        inlen       -= z;
        list[i].used = 1;
-       if (!ordered) { 
+       if (!ordered) {
           /* restart the decoder */
           i = -1;
-       }          
+       }
    }
-     
+
    for (i = 0; i < (int)outlen; i++) {
       if (list[i].used == 0) {
           err = CRYPT_INVALID_PACKET;
           goto LBL_ERR;
       }
-   }                
-   err = CRYPT_OK;   
+   }
+   err = CRYPT_OK;
 
 LBL_ERR:
    return err;
-}  
- 
+}
+
 #endif
 
 /* $Source$ */

src/pk/dh/dh_sys.c

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
   @file dh_sys.c
   DH Crypto, Tom St Denis
 */
-  
+
 /**
   Encrypt a short symmetric key with a public DH key
   @param in        The symmetric key to encrypt
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ LBL_ERR:
    @return CRYPT_OK if successful
 */
 int dh_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *in, unsigned long inlen,
-                         unsigned char *out, unsigned long *outlen, 
+                         unsigned char *out, unsigned long *outlen,
                          dh_key *key)
 {
    unsigned char *shared_secret, *skey;
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ int dh_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *in, unsigned long inlen,
 
    /* get public key */
    LOAD32L(x, in+y);
-   
+
    /* now check if the imported key will fit */
    if (inlen < x) {
       err = CRYPT_INVALID_PACKET;
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ int dh_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *in, unsigned long inlen,
    } else {
       inlen -= x;
    }
-   
+
    y += 4;
    if ((err = dh_import(in+y, x, &pubkey)) != CRYPT_OK) {
       goto LBL_ERR;
@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ int dh_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *in, unsigned long inlen,
 
    /* load in the encrypted key */
    LOAD32L(keysize, in+y);
-   
+
    /* will the out fit as part of the input */
    if (inlen < keysize) {
       err = CRYPT_INVALID_PACKET;
@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ int dh_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *in, unsigned long inlen,
    } else {
       inlen -= keysize;
    }
-   
+
    if (keysize > *outlen) {
        err = CRYPT_BUFFER_OVERFLOW;
        goto LBL_ERR;
@@ -275,27 +275,27 @@ LBL_ERR:
    return err;
 }
 
-/* perform an ElGamal Signature of a hash 
+/* perform an ElGamal Signature of a hash
  *
  * The math works as follows.  x is the private key, M is the message to sign
- 
+
  1.  pick a random k
  2.  compute a = g^k mod p
  3.  compute b = (M - xa)/k mod p
  4.  Send (a,b)
- 
+
  Now to verify with y=g^x mod p, a and b
- 
+
  1.  compute y^a * a^b = g^(xa) * g^(k*(M-xa)/k)
                        = g^(xa + (M - xa))
                        = g^M [all mod p]
-                       
+
  2.  Compare against g^M mod p [based on input hash].
- 3.  If result of #2 == result of #1 then signature valid 
+ 3.  If result of #2 == result of #1 then signature valid
 */
 
 /**
-  Sign a message digest using a DH private key 
+  Sign a message digest using a DH private key
   @param in      The data to sign
   @param inlen   The length of the input (octets)
   @param out     [out] The destination of the signature
@@ -338,16 +338,16 @@ int dh_sign_hash(const unsigned char *in,  unsigned long inlen,
 
    /* make up a random value k,
     * since the order of the group is prime
-    * we need not check if gcd(k, r) is 1 
+    * we need not check if gcd(k, r) is 1
     */
-   if (prng_descriptor[wprng].read(buf, sets[key->idx].size, prng) != 
+   if (prng_descriptor[wprng].read(buf, sets[key->idx].size, prng) !=
        (unsigned long)(sets[key->idx].size)) {
       err = CRYPT_ERROR_READPRNG;
       goto LBL_ERR;
    }
 
    /* init bignums */
-   if ((err = mp_init_multi(&a, &b, &k, &m, &p, &g, &p1, &tmp, NULL)) != CRYPT_OK) { 
+   if ((err = mp_init_multi(&a, &b, &k, &m, &p, &g, &p1, &tmp, NULL)) != CRYPT_OK) {
       goto LBL_ERR;
    }
 
@@ -369,13 +369,13 @@ int dh_sign_hash(const unsigned char *in,  unsigned long inlen,
    if ((err = mp_mulmod(a, key->x, p1, tmp)) != CRYPT_OK)                        { goto error; } /* tmp = xa */
    if ((err = mp_submod(m, tmp, p1, tmp)) != CRYPT_OK)                           { goto error; } /* tmp = M - xa */
    if ((err = mp_mulmod(k, tmp, p1, b)) != CRYPT_OK)                             { goto error; } /* b = (M - xa)/k */
-   
+
    /* check for overflow */
    if ((unsigned long)(PACKET_SIZE + 4 + 4 + mp_unsigned_bin_size(a) + mp_unsigned_bin_size(b)) > *outlen) {
       err = CRYPT_BUFFER_OVERFLOW;
       goto LBL_ERR;
    }
-   
+
    /* store header  */
    y = PACKET_SIZE;
 
@@ -423,7 +423,7 @@ LBL_ERR:
    @return CRYPT_OK if succsessful (even if signature is invalid)
 */
 int dh_verify_hash(const unsigned char *sig, unsigned long siglen,
-                   const unsigned char *hash, unsigned long hashlen, 
+                   const unsigned char *hash, unsigned long hashlen,
                          int *stat, dh_key *key)
 {
    void        *a, *b, *p, *g, *m, *tmp;
@@ -441,18 +441,18 @@ int dh_verify_hash(const unsigned char *sig, unsigned long siglen,
    /* check initial input length */
    if (siglen < PACKET_SIZE+4+4) {
       return CRYPT_INVALID_PACKET;
-   } 
+   }
 
    /* header ok? */
    if ((err = packet_valid_header((unsigned char *)sig, PACKET_SECT_DH, PACKET_SUB_SIGNED)) != CRYPT_OK) {
       return err;
    }
-   
+
    /* get hash out of packet */
    y = PACKET_SIZE;
 
    /* init all bignums */
-   if ((err = mp_init_multi(&a, &p, &b, &g, &m, &tmp, NULL)) != CRYPT_OK) { 
+   if ((err = mp_init_multi(&a, &p, &b, &g, &m, &tmp, NULL)) != CRYPT_OK) {
       return err;
    }