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- #include "LinuxDropPrivileges.hpp"
- #include <linux/capability.h>
- #include <linux/securebits.h>
- #include <sys/prctl.h>
- #include <sys/stat.h>
- #include <sys/syscall.h>
- #include <sys/types.h>
- #include <sys/wait.h>
- #include <pwd.h>
- #include <stdlib.h>
- #include <unistd.h>
- namespace ZeroTier {
- #ifndef PR_CAP_AMBIENT
- // if we are on old libc, dropPrivileges is nop
- void dropPrivileges(std::string homeDir) {}
- #else
- const char* TARGET_USER_NAME = "zerotier-one";
- struct cap_header_struct {
- __u32 version;
- int pid;
- };
- struct cap_data_struct {
- __u32 effective;
- __u32 permitted;
- __u32 inheritable;
- };
- // libc doesn't export capset, it is instead located in libcap
- // We ignore libcap and call it manually.
- int capset(cap_header_struct* hdrp, cap_data_struct* datap) {
- return syscall(SYS_capset, hdrp, datap);
- }
- void notDropping(std::string homeDir) {
- struct stat buf;
- if (lstat(homeDir.c_str(), &buf) < 0) {
- if (buf.st_uid != 0 || buf.st_gid != 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: failed to drop privileges. Refusing to run as root, because %s was already used in nonprivileged mode.\n", homeDir.c_str());
- exit(1);
- }
- }
- fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: failed to drop privileges, running as root\n");
- }
- int setCapabilities(int flags) {
- cap_header_struct capheader = {_LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1, 0};
- cap_data_struct capdata;
- capdata.inheritable = capdata.permitted = capdata.effective = flags;
- return capset(&capheader, &capdata);
- }
- void createOwnedHomedir(std::string homeDir, struct passwd* targetUser) {
- struct stat buf;
- if (lstat(homeDir.c_str(), &buf) < 0) {
- if (errno == ENOENT) {
- mkdir(homeDir.c_str(), 0755);
- } else {
- perror("cannot access home directory");
- exit(1);
- }
- }
- if (buf.st_uid != 0 || buf.st_gid != 0) {
- // should be already owned by zerotier-one
- if (targetUser->pw_uid != buf.st_uid) {
- fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: %s not owned by zerotier-one or root\n", homeDir.c_str());
- exit(1);
- }
- return;
- }
- // Change homedir owner to zerotier-one user. This is safe, because this directory is writable only by root, so no one could have created malicious hardlink.
- long p = (long)fork();
- int exitcode = -1;
- if (p > 0) {
- waitpid(p, &exitcode, 0);
- } else if (p == 0) {
- std::string ownerString = std::to_string(targetUser->pw_uid) + ":" + std::to_string(targetUser->pw_gid);
- execlp("chown", "chown", "-R", ownerString.c_str(), "--", homeDir.c_str(), NULL);
- _exit(-1);
- }
- if (exitcode != 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "failed to change owner of %s to %s\n", homeDir.c_str(), targetUser->pw_name);
- exit(1);
- }
- }
- void dropPrivileges(std::string homeDir) {
- // dropPrivileges switches to zerotier-one user while retaining CAP_NET_ADMIN
- // and CAP_NET_RAW capabilities.
- struct passwd* targetUser = getpwnam(TARGET_USER_NAME);
- if (targetUser == NULL) {
- // zerotier-one user not configured by package
- return;
- }
- createOwnedHomedir(homeDir, targetUser);
- if (prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET, CAP_NET_RAW, 0, 0) < 0) {
- // Kernel has no support for ambient capabilities.
- notDropping(homeDir);
- return;
- }
- if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS | SECBIT_NOROOT) < 0) {
- notDropping(homeDir);
- return;
- }
- if (setCapabilities((1 << CAP_NET_ADMIN) | (1 << CAP_NET_RAW) | (1 << CAP_SETUID) | (1 << CAP_SETGID)) < 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: failed to set capabilities (not running as real root?)\n");
- exit(1);
- }
- int oldDumpable = prctl(PR_GET_DUMPABLE);
- if (prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0) < 0) {
- // Disable ptracing. Otherwise there is a small window when previous
- // compromised ZeroTier process could ptrace us, when we still have CAP_SETUID.
- // (this is mitigated anyway on most distros by ptrace_scope=1)
- perror("prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE)");
- exit(1);
- }
- if (setgid(targetUser->pw_gid) < 0) {
- perror("setgid");
- exit(1);
- }
- if (setuid(targetUser->pw_uid) < 0) {
- perror("setuid");
- exit(1);
- }
- if (setCapabilities((1 << CAP_NET_ADMIN) | (1 << CAP_NET_RAW)) < 0) {
- perror("could not drop capabilities after setuid");
- exit(1);
- }
- if (prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, oldDumpable) < 0) {
- perror("could not restore dumpable flag");
- exit(1);
- }
- if (prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE, CAP_NET_ADMIN, 0, 0) < 0) {
- perror("could not raise ambient CAP_NET_ADMIN");
- exit(1);
- }
- if (prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE, CAP_NET_RAW, 0, 0) < 0) {
- perror("could not raise ambient CAP_NET_RAW");
- exit(1);
- }
- }
- #endif
- }
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