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- /*
- * libwebsockets - small server side websockets and web server implementation
- *
- * Copyright (C) 2010 - 2019 Andy Green <[email protected]>
- *
- * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
- * of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to
- * deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the
- * rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or
- * sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
- * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
- *
- * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
- * all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
- * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
- * AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
- * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING
- * FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS
- * IN THE SOFTWARE.
- */
- #include "private-lib-core.h"
- #include "private-lib-jose-jwe.h"
- int
- lws_jwe_encrypt_cbc_hs(struct lws_jwe *jwe, uint8_t *cek,
- uint8_t *aad, int aad_len)
- {
- int n, hlen = (int)lws_genhmac_size(jwe->jose.enc_alg->hmac_type);
- uint8_t digest[LWS_GENHASH_LARGEST];
- struct lws_gencrypto_keyelem el;
- struct lws_genhmac_ctx hmacctx;
- struct lws_genaes_ctx aesctx;
- size_t paddedlen;
- uint8_t al[8];
- /* Caller must have prepared space for the results */
- if (jwe->jws.map.len[LJWE_ATAG] != (unsigned int)hlen / 2) {
- lwsl_notice("%s: expected tag len %d, got %d\n", __func__,
- hlen / 2, jwe->jws.map.len[LJWE_ATAG]);
- return -1;
- }
- if (jwe->jws.map.len[LJWE_IV] != 16) {
- lwsl_notice("expected iv len %d, got %d\n", 16,
- jwe->jws.map.len[LJWE_IV]);
- return -1;
- }
- /* first create the authentication hmac */
- /* JWA Section 5.2.2.1
- *
- * 1. The secondary keys MAC_KEY and ENC_KEY are generated from the
- * input key K as follows. Each of these two keys is an octet
- * string.
- *
- * MAC_KEY consists of the initial MAC_KEY_LEN octets of K, in
- * order.
- * ENC_KEY consists of the final ENC_KEY_LEN octets of K, in
- * order.
- */
- /*
- * 2. The IV used is a 128-bit value generated randomly or
- * pseudorandomly for use in the cipher.
- */
- lws_get_random(jwe->jws.context, (void *)jwe->jws.map.buf[LJWE_IV], 16);
- /*
- * 3. The plaintext is CBC encrypted using PKCS #7 padding using
- * ENC_KEY as the key and the IV. We denote the ciphertext output
- * from this step as E.
- */
- /* second half is the AES ENC_KEY */
- el.buf = cek + (hlen / 2);
- el.len = hlen / 2;
- if (lws_genaes_create(&aesctx, LWS_GAESO_ENC, LWS_GAESM_CBC, &el,
- LWS_GAESP_WITH_PADDING, NULL)) {
- lwsl_err("%s: lws_genaes_create failed\n", __func__);
- return -1;
- }
- /*
- * the plaintext gets delivered to us in LJWE_CTXT, this replaces the
- * plaintext there with the ciphertext, which will be larger by some
- * padding bytes
- */
- n = lws_genaes_crypt(&aesctx, (uint8_t *)jwe->jws.map.buf[LJWE_CTXT],
- jwe->jws.map.len[LJWE_CTXT],
- (uint8_t *)jwe->jws.map.buf[LJWE_CTXT],
- (uint8_t *)jwe->jws.map.buf[LJWE_IV],
- NULL, NULL, LWS_AES_CBC_BLOCKLEN);
- paddedlen = lws_gencrypto_padded_length(LWS_AES_CBC_BLOCKLEN,
- jwe->jws.map.len[LJWE_CTXT]);
- jwe->jws.map.len[LJWE_CTXT] = (uint32_t)paddedlen;
- lws_genaes_destroy(&aesctx, (uint8_t *)jwe->jws.map.buf[LJWE_CTXT] +
- paddedlen - LWS_AES_CBC_BLOCKLEN, LWS_AES_CBC_BLOCKLEN);
- if (n) {
- lwsl_err("%s: lws_genaes_crypt failed\n", __func__);
- return -1;
- }
- /*
- * 4. The octet string AL is equal to the number of bits in the
- * Additional Authenticated Data A expressed as a 64-bit unsigned
- * big-endian integer.
- */
- lws_jwe_be64(aad_len * 8, al);
- /* first half of the CEK is the MAC key */
- if (lws_genhmac_init(&hmacctx, jwe->jose.enc_alg->hmac_type,
- cek, hlen / 2))
- return -1;
- /*
- * 5. A message Authentication Tag T is computed by applying HMAC
- * [RFC2104] to the following data, in order:
- *
- * - the Additional Authenticated Data A,
- * - the Initialization Vector IV,
- * - the ciphertext E computed in the previous step, and
- * - the octet string AL defined above.
- *
- * The string MAC_KEY is used as the MAC key. We denote the output
- * of the MAC computed in this step as M. The first T_LEN octets of
- * M are used as T.
- */
- if (lws_genhmac_update(&hmacctx, aad, aad_len) ||
- lws_genhmac_update(&hmacctx, jwe->jws.map.buf[LJWE_IV],
- LWS_JWE_AES_IV_BYTES) ||
- /* since we encrypted it, this is the ciphertext */
- lws_genhmac_update(&hmacctx,
- (uint8_t *)jwe->jws.map.buf[LJWE_CTXT],
- jwe->jws.map.len[LJWE_CTXT]) ||
- lws_genhmac_update(&hmacctx, al, 8)) {
- lwsl_err("%s: hmac computation failed\n", __func__);
- lws_genhmac_destroy(&hmacctx, NULL);
- return -1;
- }
- if (lws_genhmac_destroy(&hmacctx, digest)) {
- lwsl_err("%s: problem destroying hmac\n", __func__);
- return -1;
- }
- /* create tag */
- memcpy((void *)jwe->jws.map.buf[LJWE_ATAG], digest, hlen / 2);
- return jwe->jws.map.len[LJWE_CTXT];
- }
- int
- lws_jwe_auth_and_decrypt_cbc_hs(struct lws_jwe *jwe, uint8_t *enc_cek,
- uint8_t *aad, int aad_len)
- {
- int n, hlen = (int)lws_genhmac_size(jwe->jose.enc_alg->hmac_type);
- uint8_t digest[LWS_GENHASH_LARGEST];
- struct lws_gencrypto_keyelem el;
- struct lws_genhmac_ctx hmacctx;
- struct lws_genaes_ctx aesctx;
- uint8_t al[8];
- /* Some sanity checks on what came in */
- if (jwe->jws.map.len[LJWE_ATAG] != (unsigned int)hlen / 2) {
- lwsl_notice("%s: expected tag len %d, got %d\n", __func__,
- hlen / 2, jwe->jws.map.len[LJWE_ATAG]);
- return -1;
- }
- if (jwe->jws.map.len[LJWE_IV] != 16) {
- lwsl_notice("expected iv len %d, got %d\n", 16,
- jwe->jws.map.len[LJWE_IV]);
- return -1;
- }
- /* Prepare to check authentication
- *
- * AAD is the b64 JOSE header.
- *
- * The octet string AL, which is the number of bits in AAD expressed as
- * a big-endian 64-bit unsigned integer is:
- *
- * [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 152]
- *
- * Concatenate the AAD, the Initialization Vector, the ciphertext, and
- * the AL value.
- *
- */
- lws_jwe_be64(aad_len * 8, al);
- /* first half of enc_cek is the MAC key */
- if (lws_genhmac_init(&hmacctx, jwe->jose.enc_alg->hmac_type, enc_cek,
- hlen / 2)) {
- lwsl_err("%s: lws_genhmac_init fail\n", __func__);
- return -1;
- }
- if (lws_genhmac_update(&hmacctx, aad, aad_len) ||
- lws_genhmac_update(&hmacctx, (uint8_t *)jwe->jws.map.buf[LJWE_IV],
- jwe->jws.map.len[LJWE_IV]) ||
- lws_genhmac_update(&hmacctx, (uint8_t *)jwe->jws.map.buf[LJWE_CTXT],
- jwe->jws.map.len[LJWE_CTXT]) ||
- lws_genhmac_update(&hmacctx, al, 8)) {
- lwsl_err("%s: hmac computation failed\n", __func__);
- lws_genhmac_destroy(&hmacctx, NULL);
- return -1;
- }
- if (lws_genhmac_destroy(&hmacctx, digest)) {
- lwsl_err("%s: problem destroying hmac\n", __func__);
- return -1;
- }
- /* first half of digest is the auth tag */
- if (lws_timingsafe_bcmp(digest, jwe->jws.map.buf[LJWE_ATAG], hlen / 2)) {
- lwsl_err("%s: auth failed: hmac tag (%d) != ATAG (%d)\n",
- __func__, hlen / 2, jwe->jws.map.len[LJWE_ATAG]);
- lwsl_hexdump_notice(jwe->jws.map.buf[LJWE_ATAG], hlen / 2);
- lwsl_hexdump_notice(digest, hlen / 2);
- return -1;
- }
- /* second half of enc cek is the CEK KEY */
- el.buf = enc_cek + (hlen / 2);
- el.len = hlen / 2;
- if (lws_genaes_create(&aesctx, LWS_GAESO_DEC, LWS_GAESM_CBC,
- &el, LWS_GAESP_NO_PADDING, NULL)) {
- lwsl_err("%s: lws_genaes_create failed\n", __func__);
- return -1;
- }
- n = lws_genaes_crypt(&aesctx, (uint8_t *)jwe->jws.map.buf[LJWE_CTXT],
- jwe->jws.map.len[LJWE_CTXT],
- (uint8_t *)jwe->jws.map.buf[LJWE_CTXT],
- (uint8_t *)jwe->jws.map.buf[LJWE_IV], NULL, NULL, 16);
- /* Strip the PKCS #7 padding */
- if (jwe->jws.map.len[LJWE_CTXT] < LWS_AES_CBC_BLOCKLEN ||
- jwe->jws.map.len[LJWE_CTXT] <= (unsigned char)jwe->jws.map.buf[LJWE_CTXT]
- [jwe->jws.map.len[LJWE_CTXT] - 1]) {
- lwsl_err("%s: invalid padded ciphertext length: %d. Corrupt data?\n",
- __func__, jwe->jws.map.len[LJWE_CTXT]);
- return -1;
- }
- jwe->jws.map.len[LJWE_CTXT] -= jwe->jws.map.buf[LJWE_CTXT][
- jwe->jws.map.len[LJWE_CTXT] - 1];
- n |= lws_genaes_destroy(&aesctx, NULL, 0);
- if (n) {
- lwsl_err("%s: lws_genaes_crypt failed\n", __func__);
- return -1;
- }
- return jwe->jws.map.len[LJWE_CTXT];
- }
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