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@@ -166,212 +166,216 @@ func (f *Interface) readOutsidePacketFromRelay(via ViaSender, out []byte, packet
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f.connectionManager.In(hostinfo)
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}
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-func (f *Interface) readOutsidePacketsMany(packets []*packet.Packet, out []*packet.OutPacket, h *header.H, fwPacket *firewall.Packet, lhf *LightHouseHandler, nb []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache, now time.Time) {
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- for i, pkt := range packets {
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- out[i].Scratch = out[i].Scratch[:0]
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- via := ViaSender{UdpAddr: pkt.AddrPort()}
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+func (f *Interface) readOutsideSegment(via ViaSender, segment []byte, out *packet.OutPacket, h *header.H, fwPacket *firewall.Packet, lhf *LightHouseHandler, nb []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache, now time.Time) {
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+ err := h.Parse(segment)
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+ if err != nil {
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+ // Hole punch packets are 0 or 1 byte big, so let's ignore printing those errors
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+ if len(segment) > 1 {
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+ f.l.WithField("packet", segment).Infof("Error while parsing inbound packet from %s: %s", via, err)
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+ }
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+ return
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+ }
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- //l.Error("in packet ", header, packet[HeaderLen:])
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- if !via.IsRelayed {
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- if f.myVpnNetworksTable.Contains(via.UdpAddr.Addr()) {
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- if f.l.Level >= logrus.DebugLevel {
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- f.l.WithField("from", via).Debug("Refusing to process double encrypted packet")
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- }
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- return
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- }
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+ var hostinfo *HostInfo
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+ // verify if we've seen this index before, otherwise respond to the handshake initiation
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+ if h.Type == header.Message && h.Subtype == header.MessageRelay {
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+ hostinfo = f.hostMap.QueryRelayIndex(h.RemoteIndex)
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+ } else {
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+ hostinfo = f.hostMap.QueryIndex(h.RemoteIndex)
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+ }
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+
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+ var ci *ConnectionState
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+ if hostinfo != nil {
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+ ci = hostinfo.ConnectionState
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+ }
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+
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+ switch h.Type {
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+ case header.Message:
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+ if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, via, h) {
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+ return
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}
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- for segment := range pkt.Segments() {
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- err := h.Parse(segment)
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- if err != nil {
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- // Hole punch packets are 0 or 1 byte big, so lets ignore printing those errors
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- if len(segment) > 1 {
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- f.l.WithField("packet", pkt).Infof("Error while parsing inbound packet from %s: %s", via, err)
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- }
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+ switch h.Subtype {
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+ case header.MessageNone:
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+ if !f.decryptToTunDelayWrite(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, out, segment, fwPacket, nb, q, localCache, now) {
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return
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}
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-
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- var hostinfo *HostInfo
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- // verify if we've seen this index before, otherwise respond to the handshake initiation
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- if h.Type == header.Message && h.Subtype == header.MessageRelay {
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- hostinfo = f.hostMap.QueryRelayIndex(h.RemoteIndex)
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- } else {
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- hostinfo = f.hostMap.QueryIndex(h.RemoteIndex)
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+ case header.MessageRelay:
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+ // The entire body is sent as AD, not encrypted.
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+ // The packet consists of a 16-byte parsed Nebula header, Associated Data-protected payload, and a trailing 16-byte AEAD signature value.
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+ // The packet is guaranteed to be at least 16 bytes at this point, b/c it got past the h.Parse() call above. If it's
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+ // otherwise malformed (meaning, there is no trailing 16 byte AEAD value), then this will result in at worst a 0-length slice
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+ // which will gracefully fail in the DecryptDanger call.
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+ signedPayload := segment[:len(segment)-hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.Overhead()]
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+ signatureValue := segment[len(segment)-hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.Overhead():]
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+ out.Scratch, err = hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.DecryptDanger(out.Scratch, signedPayload, signatureValue, h.MessageCounter, nb)
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+ if err != nil {
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+ return
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}
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+ // Successfully validated the thing. Get rid of the Relay header.
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+ signedPayload = signedPayload[header.Len:]
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+ // Pull the Roaming parts up here, and return in all call paths.
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+ f.handleHostRoaming(hostinfo, via)
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+ // Track usage of both the HostInfo and the Relay for the received & authenticated packet
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+ f.connectionManager.In(hostinfo)
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+ f.connectionManager.RelayUsed(h.RemoteIndex)
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- var ci *ConnectionState
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- if hostinfo != nil {
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- ci = hostinfo.ConnectionState
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+ relay, ok := hostinfo.relayState.QueryRelayForByIdx(h.RemoteIndex)
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+ if !ok {
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+ // The only way this happens is if hostmap has an index to the correct HostInfo, but the HostInfo is missing
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+ // its internal mapping. This should never happen.
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+ hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithFields(logrus.Fields{"vpnAddrs": hostinfo.vpnAddrs, "remoteIndex": h.RemoteIndex}).Error("HostInfo missing remote relay index")
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+ return
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}
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- switch h.Type {
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- case header.Message:
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- if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, via, h) {
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+ switch relay.Type {
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+ case TerminalType:
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+ // If I am the target of this relay, process the unwrapped packet
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+ // From this recursive point, all these variables are 'burned'. We shouldn't rely on them again.
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+ via = ViaSender{
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+ UdpAddr: via.UdpAddr,
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+ relayHI: hostinfo,
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+ remoteIdx: relay.RemoteIndex,
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+ relay: relay,
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+ IsRelayed: true,
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+ }
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+ f.readOutsidePacketFromRelay(via, out.Scratch[:0], signedPayload, h, fwPacket, lhf, nb, q, localCache, now)
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+ return
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+ case ForwardingType:
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+ // Find the target HostInfo relay object
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+ targetHI, targetRelay, err := f.hostMap.QueryVpnAddrsRelayFor(hostinfo.vpnAddrs, relay.PeerAddr)
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+ if err != nil {
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+ hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithField("relayTo", relay.PeerAddr).WithError(err).WithField("hostinfo.vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs).Info("Failed to find target host info by ip")
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return
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}
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- switch h.Subtype {
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- case header.MessageNone:
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- if !f.decryptToTunDelayWrite(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, out[i], pkt, segment, fwPacket, nb, q, localCache, now) {
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- return
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- }
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- case header.MessageRelay:
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- // The entire body is sent as AD, not encrypted.
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- // The packet consists of a 16-byte parsed Nebula header, Associated Data-protected payload, and a trailing 16-byte AEAD signature value.
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- // The packet is guaranteed to be at least 16 bytes at this point, b/c it got past the h.Parse() call above. If it's
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- // otherwise malformed (meaning, there is no trailing 16 byte AEAD value), then this will result in at worst a 0-length slice
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- // which will gracefully fail in the DecryptDanger call.
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- signedPayload := segment[:len(segment)-hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.Overhead()]
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- signatureValue := segment[len(segment)-hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.Overhead():]
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- out[i].Scratch, err = hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.DecryptDanger(out[i].Scratch, signedPayload, signatureValue, h.MessageCounter, nb)
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- if err != nil {
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- return
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- }
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- // Successfully validated the thing. Get rid of the Relay header.
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- signedPayload = signedPayload[header.Len:]
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- // Pull the Roaming parts up here, and return in all call paths.
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- f.handleHostRoaming(hostinfo, via)
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- // Track usage of both the HostInfo and the Relay for the received & authenticated packet
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- f.connectionManager.In(hostinfo)
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- f.connectionManager.RelayUsed(h.RemoteIndex)
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-
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- relay, ok := hostinfo.relayState.QueryRelayForByIdx(h.RemoteIndex)
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- if !ok {
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- // The only way this happens is if hostmap has an index to the correct HostInfo, but the HostInfo is missing
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- // its internal mapping. This should never happen.
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- hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithFields(logrus.Fields{"vpnAddrs": hostinfo.vpnAddrs, "remoteIndex": h.RemoteIndex}).Error("HostInfo missing remote relay index")
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+ // If that relay is Established, forward the payload through it
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+ if targetRelay.State == Established {
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+ switch targetRelay.Type {
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+ case ForwardingType:
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+ // Forward this packet through the relay tunnel
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+ // Find the target HostInfo
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+ f.SendVia(targetHI, targetRelay, signedPayload, nb, out.Scratch, false)
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return
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- }
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-
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- switch relay.Type {
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case TerminalType:
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- // If I am the target of this relay, process the unwrapped packet
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- // From this recursive point, all these variables are 'burned'. We shouldn't rely on them again.
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- via = ViaSender{
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- UdpAddr: via.UdpAddr,
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- relayHI: hostinfo,
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- remoteIdx: relay.RemoteIndex,
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- relay: relay,
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- IsRelayed: true,
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- }
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- f.readOutsidePacketFromRelay(via, out[i].Scratch[:0], signedPayload, h, fwPacket, lhf, nb, q, localCache, now)
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- return
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- case ForwardingType:
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- // Find the target HostInfo relay object
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- targetHI, targetRelay, err := f.hostMap.QueryVpnAddrsRelayFor(hostinfo.vpnAddrs, relay.PeerAddr)
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- if err != nil {
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- hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithField("relayTo", relay.PeerAddr).WithError(err).WithField("hostinfo.vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs).Info("Failed to find target host info by ip")
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- return
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- }
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-
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- // If that relay is Established, forward the payload through it
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- if targetRelay.State == Established {
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- switch targetRelay.Type {
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- case ForwardingType:
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- // Forward this packet through the relay tunnel
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- // Find the target HostInfo
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- f.SendVia(targetHI, targetRelay, signedPayload, nb, out[i].Scratch, false)
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- return
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- case TerminalType:
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- hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Unexpected Relay Type of Terminal")
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- }
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- } else {
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- hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithFields(logrus.Fields{"relayTo": relay.PeerAddr, "relayFrom": hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0], "targetRelayState": targetRelay.State}).Info("Unexpected target relay state")
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- return
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- }
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+ hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Unexpected Relay Type of Terminal")
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}
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- }
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-
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- case header.LightHouse:
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- f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
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- if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, via, h) {
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+ } else {
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+ hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithFields(logrus.Fields{"relayTo": relay.PeerAddr, "relayFrom": hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0], "targetRelayState": targetRelay.State}).Info("Unexpected target relay state")
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return
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}
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+ }
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+ }
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- d, err := f.decrypt(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, out[i].Scratch, segment, h, nb)
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- if err != nil {
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- hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithError(err).WithField("udpAddr", via.UdpAddr).
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- WithField("packet", segment).
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- Error("Failed to decrypt lighthouse packet")
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- return
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- }
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+ case header.LightHouse:
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+ f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
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+ if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, via, h) {
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+ return
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+ }
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- lhf.HandleRequest(via.UdpAddr, hostinfo.vpnAddrs, d, f)
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+ d, err := f.decrypt(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, out.Scratch, segment, h, nb)
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+ if err != nil {
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+ hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithError(err).WithField("udpAddr", via.UdpAddr).
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+ WithField("packet", segment).
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+ Error("Failed to decrypt lighthouse packet")
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+ return
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+ }
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- // Fallthrough to the bottom to record incoming traffic
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+ lhf.HandleRequest(via.UdpAddr, hostinfo.vpnAddrs, d, f)
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- case header.Test:
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- f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
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- if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, via, h) {
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- return
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- }
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+ // Fallthrough to the bottom to record incoming traffic
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- d, err := f.decrypt(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, out[i].Scratch, segment, h, nb)
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- if err != nil {
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- hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithError(err).WithField("udpAddr", via).
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- WithField("packet", segment).
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- Error("Failed to decrypt test packet")
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- return
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- }
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+ case header.Test:
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+ f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
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+ if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, via, h) {
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+ return
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+ }
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- if h.Subtype == header.TestRequest {
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- // This testRequest might be from TryPromoteBest, so we should roam
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- // to the new IP address before responding
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- f.handleHostRoaming(hostinfo, via)
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- f.send(header.Test, header.TestReply, ci, hostinfo, d, nb, out[i].Scratch)
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- }
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+ d, err := f.decrypt(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, out.Scratch, segment, h, nb)
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+ if err != nil {
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+ hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithError(err).WithField("udpAddr", via).
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+ WithField("packet", segment).
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+ Error("Failed to decrypt test packet")
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+ return
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+ }
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- // Fallthrough to the bottom to record incoming traffic
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+ if h.Subtype == header.TestRequest {
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+ // This testRequest might be from TryPromoteBest, so we should roam
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+ // to the new IP address before responding
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+ f.handleHostRoaming(hostinfo, via)
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+ f.send(header.Test, header.TestReply, ci, hostinfo, d, nb, out.Scratch)
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+ }
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- // Non encrypted messages below here, they should not fall through to avoid tracking incoming traffic since they
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- // are unauthenticated
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+ // Fallthrough to the bottom to record incoming traffic
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- case header.Handshake:
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- f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
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- f.handshakeManager.HandleIncoming(via, segment, h)
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- return
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+ // Non encrypted messages below here, they should not fall through to avoid tracking incoming traffic since they
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+ // are unauthenticated
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- case header.RecvError:
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- f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
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- f.handleRecvError(via.UdpAddr, h)
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- return
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+ case header.Handshake:
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+ f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
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+ f.handshakeManager.HandleIncoming(via, segment, h)
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+ return
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- case header.CloseTunnel:
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- f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
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- if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, via, h) {
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- return
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- }
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+ case header.RecvError:
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+ f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
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+ f.handleRecvError(via.UdpAddr, h)
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+ return
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- hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithField("udpAddr", via).
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- Info("Close tunnel received, tearing down.")
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+ case header.CloseTunnel:
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+ f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
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+ if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, via, h) {
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+ return
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+ }
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- f.closeTunnel(hostinfo)
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- return
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+ hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithField("udpAddr", via).
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+ Info("Close tunnel received, tearing down.")
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- case header.Control:
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- if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, via, h) {
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- return
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- }
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+ f.closeTunnel(hostinfo)
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+ return
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- d, err := f.decrypt(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, out[i].Scratch, segment, h, nb)
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- if err != nil {
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- hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithError(err).WithField("udpAddr", via).
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- WithField("packet", segment).
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- Error("Failed to decrypt Control packet")
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- return
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- }
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+ case header.Control:
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+ if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, via, h) {
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+ return
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+ }
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+
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+ d, err := f.decrypt(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, out.Scratch, segment, h, nb)
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+ if err != nil {
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+ hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithError(err).WithField("udpAddr", via).
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+ WithField("packet", segment).
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+ Error("Failed to decrypt Control packet")
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+ return
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+ }
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+
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+ f.relayManager.HandleControlMsg(hostinfo, d, f)
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+
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+ default:
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+ f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
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+ hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debugf("Unexpected packet received from %s", via)
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+ return
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+ }
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- f.relayManager.HandleControlMsg(hostinfo, d, f)
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+ f.handleHostRoaming(hostinfo, via)
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+
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+ f.connectionManager.In(hostinfo)
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+}
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+
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+func (f *Interface) readOutsidePacketsMany(packets []*packet.Packet, out []*packet.OutPacket, h *header.H, fwPacket *firewall.Packet, lhf *LightHouseHandler, nb []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache, now time.Time) {
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|
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+ for i, pkt := range packets {
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+ out[i].Scratch = out[i].Scratch[:0]
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+ via := ViaSender{UdpAddr: pkt.AddrPort()}
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- default:
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- f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
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|
|
- hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debugf("Unexpected packet received from %s", via)
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|
|
+ //l.Error("in packet ", header, packet[HeaderLen:])
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|
|
+ if !via.IsRelayed {
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|
|
+ if f.myVpnNetworksTable.Contains(via.UdpAddr.Addr()) {
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|
|
+ if f.l.Level >= logrus.DebugLevel {
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|
|
+ f.l.WithField("from", via).Debug("Refusing to process double encrypted packet")
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|
|
+ }
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|
|
return
|
|
|
}
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|
+ }
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|
|
|
|
|
- f.handleHostRoaming(hostinfo, via)
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|
|
-
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|
|
- f.connectionManager.In(hostinfo)
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|
|
+ for segment := range pkt.Segments() {
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|
|
+ f.readOutsideSegment(via, segment, out[i], h, fwPacket, lhf, nb, q, localCache, now)
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
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|
|
_, err := f.readers[q].WriteOne(out[i], false, q)
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|
|
@@ -630,7 +634,7 @@ func (f *Interface) decrypt(hostinfo *HostInfo, mc uint64, out []byte, packet []
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|
|
return out, nil
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-func (f *Interface) decryptToTunDelayWrite(hostinfo *HostInfo, messageCounter uint64, out *packet.OutPacket, pkt *packet.Packet, inSegment []byte, fwPacket *firewall.Packet, nb []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache, now time.Time) bool {
|
|
|
+func (f *Interface) decryptToTunDelayWrite(hostinfo *HostInfo, messageCounter uint64, out *packet.OutPacket, inSegment []byte, fwPacket *firewall.Packet, nb []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache, now time.Time) bool {
|
|
|
var err error
|
|
|
|
|
|
seg, err := f.readers[q].AllocSeg(out, q)
|